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Matthew J. Beemsterboer*
Abusive Language Towards Police Officers
Does Not Constitute Disorderly Conduct When
Manner of Arrest Was in Itself Unjustifiable-
Petitioner was convicted of disorderly conduct in
violation of a municipal ordinance. The alleged
violation consisted of vile and abusive language
addressed to three plain-clothed police officers who
physically overpowered petitioner, handcuffed him
and placed him under arrest while he was return-
ing to his automobile after purchasing a package
of cigarettes. The Court of Appeals of Ohio re-
versed the conviction, holding that the language
used by petitioner was justifiable under the cir-
cumstances, since it was occasioned by the manner
in which he was arrested. City of Columbus v.
Guidotti, 160 N.E.2d 355 (Court of Appeals,
Ohio 1959)
Crucial to the decision of the court was the lack
of evidence that petitioner had committed any
violation of the law prior to his detention. This
was confirmed by the fact that disorderly conduct
* Senior Law Student, Northwestern University
School of Law.
was the only charge placed against him at the
trial. Petitioner contended that he was carrying
almost one-thousand dollars on his person, and he
feared that the three plain-clothes officers were
attempting to rob him. The court agreed that de-
fendant had been provoked, and "since defendant
had committed no offense prior to his detention,
no ground existed for his arrest, and he was justi-
fied in resisting them by any manner or means
which may have been reasonably necessary to
retain his freedom."
Statute of Limitations Runs From the Date of
Crime, Not From the Date When Alleged Acces-
sory before the Fact Last Urges Another to
Commit a Crime-Petitioner McGinnis was con-
victed on various indictments as an accessory
before the fact to the million-dollar Brinks robbery.
Trial was postponed for six months because of
newspaper publicity regarding the solution of the
crime, most of which had been created by law en-
forcement officials. The last occasion upon which
petitioner had incited, procured, aided, counseled,
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hired or commanded the principals to commit the
substantive offense occurred more than six years
before the institution of prosecution, and peti-
tioner contended that the action was barred by
the appropriate statute of limitations. The prose-
cution argued that a ten year statute of limita-
tions on criminal offenses, passed after the com-
mission of the crime, was applicable. The Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts affirmed the con-
viction, holding that although the ten year statute
of limitations was inapplicable as ex post facto
legislation, the six year statute ran from the date
of the armed robbery, not from the date of Mc-
Ginnis' last overt participation. Commonwealth v.
Geagan, 159 N.E.2d. 870 (Mass. 1959).
Petitioners further argued that a fair trial was
impossible in view of the widespread newspaper
publicity regarding the solution of what- was
termed "the biggest armed robbery in the history
of the country." When the long delayed trial
finally took place, petitioners claimed that their
right to a speedy trial had been denied.-The court
concluded that although the publicity created by
law enforcement officials was indefensible, it did
not follow "that the defendants must be released,
because they can never constitutionally be tried."
Since no motion was made for a further continu-
ance or for a change of venue, it could reasonably
be concluded that the effect of the publicity had
abated by the date of the trial.
Statutes Granting Privilege From Arrest to
Parties, Witnesses and Attorneys When Going to,
Attending or Returning From Court Apply Only to
Civil Arrest-Petitioner stood trial in the Munici-
pal Court of Akron on a charge of driving an
automobile while under the influence of 'alcohol
and was acquitted of the charge. Returning home
in his automobile he was stopped by a police
officer and charged with running a red light and
operating a motor vehicle without a driver's
license. Petitioner claimed his statutory privilege
against arrest, asserting that he could not be
arrested while returning home from attending
court, but was convicted over this objection. The
Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed, holding that
statutes granting privilege from arrest to parties,
witnesses, attorneys and certain other officers of
the court while going to, attending or returning
from court apply only to civil arrest, since the
statutes exclude cases of treason, felony or breach
of the peace from their operation. City of Akron
v. Mingo, 160 N.E.2d 225 (Ohio 1959).
The court interpreted the phrase "treason,
felony and breach of the peace" as excluding from
operation of the statute all arrests and prosecu-
tions for criminal offenses. This construction is in
accord with the interpretation of the identical
phrase in the United States Constitution, appli-
cable to Senators and Representatives, announced
by the United States Supreme Court in Williamson
v. United States, 207 U.S. 425 (1908). A similar
privilege applicable to members of the British
Parliament has been construed in like manner.
Refusal of Homicide Suspect To Answer
Questions Regarding Why He Had Engaged
Counsel Not Admissible as Adoptive Admission-
Petitioner was convicted of manslaughter under
an indictment charging him with the second de-
gree murder of his wife. At the trial, a police
officer testified concerning a telephone conversa-
tion with the defendant in which the defendant
stated that he did not wish to talk to any police
official regarding the matter and that he had
engaged a lawyer. The officer further testified re-
garding a conversation in the home of defendant's
son in which the defendant refused to answer any
questions and made no response to a question in-
quiring why he had engaged counsel "if he had
nothing to worry about." The Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts reversed the conviction,
holding that the testimony was improperly ad-
mitted "since the right to the advice of counsel
would be of little value if the price for its exercise
is the risk of an inference of guilt." Commonwealth
v. Burke, 159 N.E.2d 856 (Mass. 1959).
The defense further objected to testimony and
exhibits tending to show the existence of an adul-
terous relationship of several weeks duration
between the defendant and another woman six
months prior to the wife's death. While the court
considered that such evidence might form the
basis for an inference that the accused entertained
feelings of hostility towards his wife, it thought
that the challenged evidence involved circum-
stances too remote in time and thus should have
been excluded.
Testimony of a police chemist regarding a blood
stain found on the seat of the defendant's auto-
mobile was admitted over defendant's objection.
The court agreed that such testimony was irrele-
vant since upon cross-examination the chemist
revealed that he was unable to determine whether
the blood was animal or human and could not tell
how long the stains had been present.
(For other recent case abstracts see pp. 382 and 403).
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